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For a long time social sciences scholars from different fields have devoted their 
attention to identifying the causes leading to commit criminal offences and recently lots 
of studies have included the analysis of spatial effects. Respect to the Italian crime 
phenomenon some stylized facts exist: high spatial and time variability and presence of 
“organised crime” (e.g. Mafia and Camorra) deep-seated in some local territorial areas. 
Using explanatory spatial data analysis, the paper firstly explores the spatial structure 
and distribution of four different typologies of crimes (murders, thefts, frauds, and 
squeezes) in Italian provinces in two years, 1999 and 2003. ESDA allows us to detect 
some important geographical dimensions and to distinguish crucial macro- and micro- 
territorial aspects of offences. Further, on the basis of Becker-Ehrlich model, a spatial 
cross-sectional model including deterrence, economic and socio-demographic variables 
has been performed to investigate the determinants of Italian crime for 1999 and 2003 
and its “neighbouring” effects, measured in terms of geographical  and  relational 
proximity. The empirical results obtained by using different spatial weights matrices 
highlighted that socioeconomic variables have a relevant impact on crime activities, but 
their role changes enormously respect to crimes against person (murders) or against 
property (thefts, frauds and squeezes). It is worthy to notice that severity does not show 
the expected sign: its significant and positive sign should suggest that inflicting more 
severe punishments does not always constitute a deterrence to commit crime, but it 
works on the opposite direction. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since long time, the study of the determinants and effects of crime has drawn the attention of 
scholars  from  social  sciences,  notwithstanding,  economists  turned  their  attention  to  illegal 
behaviour of individuals at the beginning of 1960s. 
The starting point of the study of crime in economic terms is the seminal paper by Becker 
(1968) on “Crime and Punishment” (see also Shaw and McKay 1942; Stigler, 1970; Ehrlich, 1973; 
Merlo, 2004). Becker’s crime economic model (CEM) is based, namely, on the relation between 
crime and punishment. According to Becker, a rational individual decides to act illegally on the 
basis of the costs and benefits connected to it; i.e. the illegal behaviour of individuals could be 
explained by means of the theory of rational behaviour under uncertainty (Becker 1968). 
In 1973, Ehrlich proposed an extension and empirical application of CEM considering a time 
allocation model. The empirical model proposed by Ehrlich considers the opportunities connected 
to both punishment and reward; i.e. cost and gains from legal and illegal activities. He verified the 
relation between the rate of crime and either deterrence and socio-economic variables.  
In  recent  years,  the  studies  on  crime  have  shifted  the  attention  from  the  strict  CEM  to 
atheoretical  models  based  on  empiricism.  Most  empirical  models  include  not  only  deterrence 
variables, but also socio-economic and demographic determinates that could explain the persistence 
and  high  rate  of  crime  like  unemployment,  age  composition  of  population,  increasing  income 
inequality, education, etc. (see Marselli and Vannini 1997; Cezay et al. 1998; Entorf and Spengler 
2000;  Buonanno  and  Leonida,  2006;  Edmark  2005;  Buonanno  and  Leonida  2006).    Further, 
recently,  complex or frontier economic models of crime departing from CEM have been proposed 
(e.g., see Burdett et al. 2004; Huang et al. 2004; Lochner 2004).  
In Italy, the analysis of crime in economic and quantitative terms has received attention only in 
the last years (see Marselli and Vannini 1997; Marselli and Vannini 2000; Buonanno and Leonida, 
2006; Marselli and Vannini 1995). An interesting empirical analysis of economic crime model for 
Italian regions for the period 1980 to 1989 has been performed by Marselli and Vannini (1997). In 
order  to  take  into  account  the  phenomenon  of  criminal  organizations  characterising  the  Italian 
crime, the authors, using a panel approach, investigated the relation among four types of crime 
(murder,  theft,  robbery  and  fraud)  and  some  relevant  economic  and  deterrence  variables.  They 
found  the  Italian  crime  is  characterized  by  some  facts:  “(i)  the  probability  of  punishment  is 
relatively more effective than both the severity of punishment and the efficiency of police authority 
in deterring crime; (ii) among the variables representing the opportunity costs of participating in 
illegal activities, the rate of unemployment, the value of public works started by government, and 
the proportion of people employed in the service sector have a significant effect; (iii) for three types 
of crime the regional unobservable component is correlated with the regressors; (iv) spillovers from 
drug consumption to theft are substantial; (v) with the exception of fraud, the results are in contrast 
with the predictions of the standard economic model of crime” (pp. 89). 
To the exception of the previous studies, it is worthy to notice the analysis of crime in Italy 
according  to  an  economic  prospective  has  not  received  a  wide  attention  yet.  In  other  words, 
whether,  on  the  one  hand,  scholars  have  paid  attention  on  territorial  disparities  of  economic 
development, on the other hand the economic empirical literature has not enough focussed on the 
differences of crime rates among regions as mirror of the regional differences of socio-economic 
development (see, e.g., Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Ichiro et al. 1999)..  
Following the previous literature, in this paper  we analyse  and verify the relation between 
crime and deterrence, economic and demographic variables for the 103 Italian provinces for two 
years, 1999 and 2003.  
The approach we follow here is loosely similar to that taken by Maselli and Vannini (1997). In 
contrast to the latter, we propose an analysis of crime at a lower territorial scale, i.e. at provincial 
level, to capture important interregional differences. Our aim is to explore which are the provincial 
determinants of crime in Italy.    3 
Further,  because  the  spatial  analysis  of  crime  has  demonstrated  that  the  location  of  illegal 
activity can supply relevant insights about the exploration of crime dynamics (see Messner et al. 
1999;  Anselin  et  al.  2000),  we  use  spatial  econometric  tools  to  assess  empirically  the  crime 
determinants considering the location of crime. Using a spatial regression model – based on spatial 
autocorrelation  techniques  –  for  cross-sectional  Italian  data,  we  investigate  if  Italian  crime  is 
characterized by neighbouring effects, either in terms of geographical contiguity distance based 
proximity and relational proximities; i.e. if the crime activity spreads through a diffusion process or 
not.  
The paper is structured  as follows.  In Section 2, by using the methodology of exploratory 
spatial data analysis (ESDA) identification and interpretation of spatial clustering of different types 
of crime (murders, thefts, frauds and squeezes) have been made. Section 3 presents some theoretical 
background and introduces the statistical model and the data used in our empirical application. In 




2.  The Italian crime: an ESDA investigation   
As  stressed  in  Marselli  and  Vannini  (1997),  Italian  crime  has  particular  qualitative  and 
quantitative  features:  firstly  crime  activities  vary  across  time  and  space;  secondly  “organised 
crime”, like Mafia, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita, has territorial roots in some 
southern regions. Bearing in mind these important features of the Italian crime phenomenon, we 
tried to capture the differences across time, across “types of crimes” and across “space”: in fact we 
studied four different kinds of crime activities – murders, thefts, frauds and squeezes – in two years, 
1999  and  2003,  at  the  provincial  level,  so  that  we  are  able  to  capture  important  interregional 
disparities.  
In Italy, in 1999 there were 4,171 crimes
1 per 100,000 inhabitants, in 2003 the value increased 
by 2.3%. This general measure of crime activities varies enormously in the “Bel Paese”: in fact in 
north-western regions in 1999 this crime index was equal to 4,867, and decreased by 2.2% in 2003; 
in  north-eastern  regions  this  index  was  nearly  equal  to  the  Italian  average  value,  4,168,  and 
increased by 4.8% in 2003; in central regions in 1999 the index was equal to 4,466, a value that 
increased by 4.3% in five years; in southern regions the value was the lowest, 3,383, but in 5 years 
it increased by 8.2%; and finally in islands, the index was 3,770 in 1999 and a 5.3% increased 
occurred in 5 years time. Concluding according to these statistics, Italy appears to be divided into 
North and South, with surprisingly no effects of the presence of crime activities related to organised 
crime.  More  plausible,  as  many  general  indexes,  these  statistics  are  missing  lots  of  important 
features, in fact a more detailed analysis at “sectorial” level of crime reveals important “criminal” 
and “territorial” differences.  
Maintaining the same territorial level of analysis (macro-regions), and limiting this preliminary 
analysis to crimes against person (murders) and crimes against patrimony (frauds) in 1999 and 
2003, interesting crimes geographies emerge, increasing the suspicion of not homogeneous spatial 
distributions
2. In 1999 in north-eastern regions, there were 2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, and 
in the southern regions there were 7 murders (Italian average was equal to 4). In 2003, statistics and 
growth rates varied, but ranks remained similar: in north-eastern regions there was a nearly 9% 
increase (2.2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants), in the southern regions a dramatic decrease (18%), 
but the statistics still remained very high (6 murders against the Italian average value equal to 3.8).  
Considering  frauds,  the  picture  varies  dramatically:  in  1999,  in  Italy  frauds  per  100,000 
inhabitants were equal to 112, in north-western regions the value was almost double than the Italian 
                                                 
1 This crime index (indice di delittuosità) is a gross measurement of crime activities and includes all kinds of crimes and 
provides a general intuition of crimes (Istat, 2006).  
2 Although statistics are different, thefts and squeezes show similar patterns to frauds and murders.      4 
average (211), and in the southern regions the number of fraud was the half of the Italian average 
value (52). In 2003, in general there was an enormous increase of this kind of crime (191%) with 
326 frauds per 100,000 inhabitants, and in the north-western regions the value remained very high 
(358 frauds per 100,000 inhabitants), while the islands registered the lowest value, 298, although 
the increase was dramatic: 451%! As we will emphasise later , this could be related to the kind of 
policy that the government followed during years, suspiciously augmenting the incentives to crime 
activities.  
These aggregate statistics show that crime is a very complex phenomenon that needs to be 
investigated at appropriate disaggregate “territorial” and “sector” level of analysis (i.e. provinces 
and different types of offences) to catch important provincial disparities. Hence suitable tools of 
analysis  (i.e.  ESDA  and  spatial  econometrics)  should  be  used  to  control  for  possible  spatial 
heterogeneity.   
Hence in this analysis we decide to identify four kinds of crime activities: murders, thefts, 
frauds and squeezes, i.e. crimes against the person and against the property, and understand how 
organised crime, socio-economic conditions, presence of foreigners affect crime activities in the 
Italian provinces. The analysis is conducted for two years, 1999 and 2003, the first and the latest 
year  available  to  conduct  a  comparable  analysis  and,  most  importantly,  to  detect,  among  other 
things, the effects of different policies on the criminals’ incentives to offend.  
The first step to identify possible patterns of spatial autocorrelation is to map the phenomena 
and conduct an exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA). Here we present the box map of the 
distribution of crimes in the Italian provinces. This visual inspection is particularly useful because 
shows the location (quartile) of each province in the entire distribution of crimes, and allows to 
detect the presence of outliers. In this section firstly we show the ESDA for each type of crime, then 
we  present  the  tests  for  spatial  autocorrelation  and  finally  the  analysis  for  local  spatial 
autocorrelation using LISA (Local indicator of spatial association).  
As shown in Figure 1, the distribution of murders is very localised: in both years a clear cut line 
dividing southern provinces (e.g. Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna) from 
the rest of Italy exists. In all these provinces, organised crime is deepened in the territory, and a 
particularly bloody crime is spread. In fact as well known in the literature, this kind of crime is 
directly linked to the presence of these organisations. These maps seem to support the suspicion of a 
positive spatial autocorrelation that needs to be detected properly with appropriate indexes and tests 
(see Tables 1-3). The maps of murders in 1999 and 2003 are not very different, although in 2003, 
two provinces (Imperia and Savona) in the north-west part of Italy are outliers and show a certain 
degree of concentration of crimes.  In 1999, there are 7 outliers: Nuoro in Sardegna, Napoli in 
Campania,  Reggio  Calabria  and  Vibo  Valentia  in  Calabria,  Brindisi  in  Puglia,  and  Imperia  in 
Liguria. In 2003 there are 8 outliers, but exclusively in the South of Italy: half of them is located in 
Calabria (a region where the local organised crime, ‘Ndrangheta is very active).   
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Figure 1: Distribution of Murders in Italian provinces 
 






























Considering the second kind of crime, thefts (Figure 2), the distribution seems to be a more 
“Northern phenomenon”, with the exception of Roma province. Inspecting the maps more in deep, 
it emerges that provinces affected by this crime are mostly “big cities” provinces (i.e. Bologna, 
Milano,  Torino,  Palermo)  and  some  “tourist”  provinces,  like  Rimini  and  Venezia.  Besides  this 
distribution reflects the Italian  economic divide: in fact this crime seems to be associated with 
economic wealth (there exists a positive correlation between GDP per capita and thefts). We should 
also remember that this might be related to a different attitude in promptly denounce offences, 
especially for small kinds of thefts (i.e. pickpocket).  
Finally in these maps thefts are clearly not a regional phenomenon, with the only exception of 
Liguria provinces, with a high number of this offence. This territorial heterogeneity justifies the 
importance to identify appropriate territorial levels of analysis, i.e. provinces, instead of regions. 
Differently from Figure 1, thefts do not show a clear spatial autocorrelation, hence we need proper 
statistics and tests to verify its presence (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Thefts in Italian provinces 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Frauds in Italian provinces 
 

































Frauds  spatial  distributions  constitute  a  very  interesting  phenomenon  (Figure  3).  Firstly  in 
1999, frauds are a North Italy phenomenon. There are only 4 outliers located in wealthiest parts of 
Italy  (Milano  and  Lodi  provinces  in  Lombardia;  Padova  and  Verona  in  Veneto).  In  addition 
Lombardia seems to be the region most affected by this kind of crime, followed by the southern part 
of Veneto. Similarly to the previous kind of offence, in this case there exists a positive correlation 
with GDP per capita as well. Interestingly in 2003 the apparent positive spatial diffusion disappear 
abruptly, there are no outliers, the phenomenon of frauds spreads all over Italian provinces, but 
some  spatial  clusters  appear  in  contiguous  provinces  (Savona,  Genova,  Asti,  Torino;  Sondrio. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Squeezes in Italian provinces 
 




































Finally, the box map of squeezes (Figure 4) reveal a distribution of crime activities very similar 
to  the  murders  one.  This  result  is  probably  related  to  the  fact  that  squeezes  need  a  particular 
“organised” criminal network structure, that is provided mostly by the organised crime, diffused in 
the southern regions. Interestingly outliers increase from 1999 to 2003. In 1999 most of the outliers 
are concentrated in eastern Sicilia and part of Calabria, with an outlier in Gorizia, a province nearby 
the Slovenian border. In 2003 the number of outliers increases, but apart from the eastern Sicilia 
and Calabria, other provinces are involved in the South (Benevento, Isernia, Foggia, Brindisi), and 
in the North (Varese and Biella) .    9 
As shown by these maps, spatial autocorrelation seems to affect all kinds of crimes . Hence to 
detect the presence of spatial autocorrelation for different types of crime activities, we use Moran-I 
and Geary-C. The former captures the “global” spatial autocorrelation, i.e. if provinces with high 
crime rate are clustered nearby or not, and ranges between -1 and +1. The latter identifies the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation, and is used to describe differences in small neighbourhoods, if 
its value is less than 1 there is a positive spatial autocorrelation, if higher than 1 there is negative 
spatial autocorrelation.  
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the results relative to the Moran-I and Geary-C  tests based on three 
different kinds of  weights matrices: the contiguity matrix (W
C), the geographical proximity matrix 
(W
P) and the relational weights matrix (W
R). This latter matrix is build according to the migration 
flows among Italian provinces occurred in 1999 and 2001 (latest year available) to detect if the 
presence of social networks – being in contact with the original places of birth – do, or do not, play 
an influential role in the diffusion of Italian crime activities. The choice to include two different 
geographical weights matrices is mostly due to the intention to distinguish contiguity geographical 
effects (i.e. sharing a border) and distance based effects (e.g. in terms of travelling distance) 
While  the  first  two  matrices  capture  spillovers  effects,  related  to  the  geographical 
neighbourhood according to different perspectives, the relational matrix captures the possible social 
network effects (see also, Maggioni et al., 2007).  
Respect  to  the  contiguity  matrix  (Table  1),  we  immediately  see  that  positive  spatial 
autocorrelation exists for all kind of crimes, both using Moran-I and Geary-C  statistics, but there 
are interesting differences for crimes and across time. First of all, spatial autocorrelation diminishes 
for all kinds of crimes: this could be due to the fact that in these two years, crime activities tend to 
spread all over Italian provinces, partially reducing the regional differences. In fact the number of 
crimes is not diminished in the period, but increased, while the coefficient of variation decreased. In 
1999 murders and squeezes have the highest values of Moran-I (and lowest for Geary-C), while in 
2003 these two types of crime behave differently: murders Moran-I is still high, although has a 
lower value, but squeezes Moran-I is very low, 35% of the previous value in 1999.  
Theft is a type of crime not particularly affected by spatial autocorrelation: in both years is very low 
(0.1877  and  0.1174),  suggesting  that  thefts  are  spread  all  over  provinces,  with  no  particular 
geographical peculiarity. Geary-C values confirm these results, with very high values nearly equal 
to 1.  
Fraud is a very particular case, because its value changes abruptly from 1999, when there exists 
high and positive spatial autocorrelation (i.e. provinces with high number of frauds are clustered, 
see Figure 3), to 2003, when the spatial autocorrelation is absent (Moran-I and Geary-C are not 
significant). These interesting results might also be related be due to policies adopted in 2003: the 
so called indultino, a law that instituted the pardon law, was adopted in the August 2003 (legge 1 
agosto 2003 n° 207), and this could have affected the incentives to crime activities all around Italian 
provinces.  
   10 
            Table 1: Moran-I and Geary-C based on contiguity matrix (W
c) 
  Moran’s I   Z Score  Geary’s C  Z Score 
         
Murders 1999  0.4842***  7.1832  0.5372***  -6.3997 
Murders 2003  0.4446***  6.6067  0.5745***  -5.8839 
         
Thefts 1999  0.1877**  2.8715  0.8173**  -2.5268 
Thefts 2003  0.1174*  1.8494  0.8681*  -1.8233 
         
Frauds 1999  0.3800***  5.6677  0.7649**  -3.2507 
Frauds 2003  0.0379  0.6940  0.9470  -0.7336 
         
Squeezes 1999  0.4682***  6.6495  0.5259***  -6.5560 
Squeezes 2003  0.1656**  0.6940  0.8660*  -1.8526 
         
 
Table  2  shows  the  Moran-I  and  Geary-C  tests  using  the  geographical  proximity  matrix, 
allowing to weight for geographical distances and detect for diminishing spillovers effects. Results 
confirm previous results obtained using the geographical contiguity matrix. All values decrease 
from  1999  to  2003  and  in  frauds  the  spatial  autocorrelation  disappears,  and  positive  spatial 
autocorrelation is highest in murders and squeezes in 1999.    
 
Table 2: Moran-I and Geary’-C based on geographical proximity matrix (W
P) 
  Moran’s I  Z Score  Geary’s C  Z Score 
         
Murders 1999  0.2178***  14.7937  0.7129***  -14.7489 
Murders 2003  0.1738***  11.9342  0.7503***  -12.8282 
         
Thefts 1999  0.0634***  4.7602  0.9292***  -3.6376 
Thefts 2003  0.0575***  4.3769  0.9551**  -2.3047 
         
Frauds 1999  0.1322***  9.2282  0.9289***  -3.6515 
Frauds 2003  -0.0055  0.2776  0.9923  -0.3640 
         
Squeezes 1999  0.2312***  15.6635  0.7085***  -14.9697 
Squeezes 2003  0.0831***  6.0351  0.8753***  -6.4039 
         
 
 
Table 3 reports the Moran-I and Geary-C tests using the relational matrix of migration and 
results show some ambiguities, especially comparing two tests. First of all, crimes are not always 
positively spatially autocorrelated: thefts are negatively spatially autocorrelated in 1999 and 2003 
according to Geary-C and in 2003 this is confirmed also by a negative and significant Moran-I. 
Similarly  frauds  show  some  ambiguities:  in  1999  they  are  affected  by  positive  spatial 
autocorrelation,  according  to  Moran-I  and  negative  according  to  Geary-C,  in  2003  spatial 
autocorrelation (both positive and negative) disappears completely.  
In 1999 murders and squeezes are positively spatially correlated, but in 2003 the spatial correlation 
reduces and for squeezes Moran-I is not significant any longer (while Geary-C is significant).    11 
 
Table 3: Moran-I and Geary-C based on relational proximity matrix (W
R) 
  Moran’s I  Z Score  Geary’s C  Z Score 
         
Murders 1999  0.0586**  2.31111  0.7940**  -2.6073 
Murders 2003  0.0396*  1.6669  0.7880**  -2.5670 
         
Thefts 1999  -0.0189  -0.3083  1.4716***  5.9700 
Thefts 2003  -0.0691**  -2.0004  1.5953***  7.2075 
         
Frauds 1999  0.1720***  6.1406  2.5437***  19.5433 
Frauds 2003  0.0256  1.1958  0.8695  -1.5802 
         
Squeezes 1999  0.0861**  3.2392  0.7536**  -3.1191 
Squeezes 2003  0.0335  1.4627  0.8253**  -2.1158 
         
 
 
To  conclude  it  seems  that  crime  activities  are  related  also  to  the  “relational  proximities”, 
migration flows between provinces and not only to geography justifying an analysis that tries to 
include also this social networks effects.  
Maps allow to detect the possible geographical patterns, Moran-I and Geary-C test for the 
presence of “global” spatial autocorrelation, but do not individuate local clusters. Hence to identify 
the local clusters we use the local indicators of spatial association (LISA)
3.  
Figure 5 shows the LISA cluster maps for murders. It clearly emerges a clear cut distinction of 
two spatial clusters: those belonging to high-high cluster, with powerful organised crime, and those 
belonging to low-low cluster. Interesting spatial outliers, high-low and low-high combinations are 
represented by Perugia, Milano and Brescia, and Benevento. In 2003 an high-high spatial cluster 
emerges from Reggio Calabria to Benevento, while the low-low spatial cluster modifies its shape 
respect to 1999, including Brescia and Milano, previously belonging to spatial outliers.     
                                                 
3 Because of similarities between the geographical distance and the proximities weights tests for spatial autocorrelation, 
here we show the LISA results for the contiguity matrix. It will be interesting to detect the LISA using the relational 
distance matrix, but Geoda, the software used to map the LISA, does not allow to use weights matrices unless they are 
dichotomised. Hence the relational matrix should be dichotomised according to a threshold value, above which there 
exists a “relational” proximity, otherwise not. The scope of this paper is firstly to analyse the effects of different weights 
matrices on crime activities, and we do not concentrate on the dichotomisation of the relational weights matrix. Hence 
for this reason we show only the LISA cluster maps for contiguity matrices.   12 
 
Figure 5: LISA cluster maps for Murders 
 




























Lisa cluster maps for thefts (Figure 6), especially for 2003, are ambiguous: in fact there are 
numerous spatial outliers belonging to low-high and high-low. Only exceptions to the presence of 
outliers are represented by the surrounding of Bologna provinces that belongs to high-high spatial 
cluster, Gargano region and Calabria belonging to low-low spatial clusters. These results could 
confirm the values of Moran-I that are very low (Table 1) and should affect the results of the 
analysis. 
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Figure 6: LISA cluster maps for Thefts 
 

























Lisa cluster maps for frauds (Figure 7) changes dramatically from  1999 to 2003. In 1999 there 
is an evident high-high  spatial cluster involving most of the  Lombardia region; and a low-low 
cluster that cut horizontally Italy from Tirreno to Adriatico Sea and in the southerner part of the 
“hill”. Some outliers (both low-high and high-low) are spatially distributed along all the Italian 
peninsula.  In  2003  there  is  a  clear  evidence  of  spotted  spatial  outliers  suggesting  for  some 
heterogeneity problems in the empirical analysis with the southerner part of the “hill” that radically 
changed its nature: from low-low it becomes a high-high cluster. 
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Figure 7: LISA cluster maps for Frauds 
 
























Finally the last Lisa presented is relative to squeezes (Figure 8). Similarly to murders Lisa 
cluster maps, in this type of offence there is a clear distinction between two spatial clusters: a 
northern  cluster  (low-low)  involving  mostly  the  Triveneto  region  and  a  territorial  appendix  in 
Emilia Romagna, and a southern spatial cluster (high-high) involving half of Sicily and continues to 
the peninsula. The spatial outliers are 3 and spread around Italy. The picture slightly changes in 
2003: the northern region belonging to the low-low spatial cluster becomes much denser, and the 
high-high spatial cluster become more sparse.    15 
Figure 8: LISA cluster maps for Squeezes 
 




























Concluding  this  section  relative  to  the  ESDA,  we  can  say  that  crime  activities  in  Italian 
provinces are affected by spatial autocorrelation, that changes over time: the spatial autocorrelation 
is more relevant 1999 and decreases in 2003. The territorial level of analysis, provinces, allows us 
to  detect  for  intra-regional  disparities  otherwise  distorted.  The  spatial  autocorrelation  is 
substantially the same, considering the geographical proximity or contiguity, and shows similar 
patterns (especially for murders and squeezes) using the relational weights matrix, reflecting the 




3.  Theoretical background and empirical model 
 
In the recent years, based on the traditional Becker-Ehrlich deterrence model, many empirical 
studies  have  been  emerged  in  the  economic  literature  as  an  extension  of  CEM.  Specifically, 
atheoretical models have been motivated, on the one hand, by the increase of criminal activities, 
and on the other one, by the relevant socio-economic aspects that characterize the development of 
countries  affecting  the  dynamics  of  crime;  i.e.,  regional  unemployment  differences,  income 
inequality, migration, high level of education, etc.   16 
Marselli  and  Vannini  (1997)  –  following  the  CEM  interpretation  of  crime  phenomenon  – 
extended  the  factors  that  might  influence  the  crime  rates  in  Italy.  They  related  crime  rates  to 
deterrence variables but also to socio-economic and demographic variables: real consumption per 
capita, unemployment rate, public works, the share of employed in the service sector, social security 
benefits, average monthly salary, the share of young male on the total population, the share of 
students that achieved the secondary and high school degree. They found that the probability to be 
convicted affects positively on crime activities, discouraging the criminal activities and its effect is 
more effective than the severity of punishment and detective efficiency of judicial system. Further, 
among the socio-economic variables, unemployment, employment in service sector and number of 
public workers have a significant effect in explaining crime rates, while the level of education of 
population and the share of  young males do not have any effect on crime rates relating to the 
different kinds of crimes. 
Ehtorf  and  Spengler  (2000),  using  a  panel  of  the  German  Laender,  tested  the  deterrence 
hypothesis by CEM, but also the effect of some socio-demographic  and economic variables to 
explain the crime differences. They found that  the deterrence hypothesis is verified, though its 
power is weaker with respect to crime against the person than crime against property. With respect 
to demographic variables, they found the young unemployment and the share of foreigners have a 
significant influence on the explanation of crime. Specifically, relating to the latter, it is positively 
associated with the crime against the property. 
Using Johansen cointegration techniques,  Luiz (2001) analyses the association between per 
capita crime levels and income per capita as proxy of economic opportunities, police officers per 
capita, conviction rates, and political instability. The analysis concerned different crime series for 
South Africa for the period between 1960 and 1993. 
In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  literature,  it  is  worthy  to  notice  there  is  a  wide  number  of 
empirical  studies  focussed  on  the  relation  between  crime  disparities  and  the  features  of  labour 
market and skills of working age population (see, e.g., Lochner 2004; Burdett et al. 2004; Edmark 
2005). 
Following the previous literature we propose a cross-sectional analysis of provincial crime rates in 
Italy for years 1999 and 2003. Considering the geographical structure of Italian crime activities, we 
develop a model including deterrence and socio-economic variables, as well as spatial dependence 
effects
4 to investigate the determinants of crime in Italy. Following Cherry and List (2002), to avoid 
possible bias estimation linked to aggregation of crime activities, we consider four different types of 
crime: murders, thefts, frauds and squeezes. 
To explore both the significance of spatial clusters of crime rates and the determinants of crime 
activities, our starting point is a cross-sectional regression model on provincial crime rates without 
spatial effects. In particular, the following general theoretical model is used as a starting point: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 25 29
7 8 9 10 11         + +
t t t t t t t
j o
t t t t t
C Severity Probability Unknown Sser Sind Umale
GDP RGDP Young Old Foreigners
β β β β β β β
β β β β β ε
− = + + + + + + +
+ + + +
             (1) 
where Cj indicates the different kinds of crime; Severity is the average time spent in prison as a 
proxy  for  deterrence  variable;  Probability  is  the  share  of  offenders  convicted  over  the  total 
provincial reported offenders
5 as a proxy for deterrence variable; Unknown is the share of crimes 
committed by unknown persons over the total recorded crimes in each kind of crime as a proxy for 
deterrence variable. The expected sign of the latter deterrence variable is positive; while severity 
and probability have a negative expected sign, a longer average convict time and a high probability 
to be convicted should not incentive potential offenders to do illegal activities.  
                                                 
4 At this first attempt we consider only the spatial dependence effect and not also the heterogeneity spatial effect. 
5 The data on severity and probability for each kind of crime are not available at provincial level, so we use the average 
time spent in prison and the offenders convicted relate to the all crime activities.    17 
The other explanatory variables are proxies for socio-economics and demographic aspects. Sind 
is equal to the share of firms in the industrial sector over total provincial firms. Sser is equal to the 
share of firms in the service sector over total provincial firms. Sind and Sser are proxies for the 
provincial  economic  structure,  though  it  is  not  always  clear  which  sign  these  control  variables 
should have. Clearly, intuitively, in provinces characterizing by high share of industrial and services 
firms it should be easier to find a job, so the inclination to commit an offence should be lower. 
Umale25-29 is the unemployment rate of the cohort males from 25 to 29 years old, it is a proxy for 
opportunity cost of legal and illegal activities; a positive sign of its coefficient should indicate that 
people excluded from labour market as they do not have an income, they tend to commit a crime. 
GDP is the gross domestic product per capita as proxy for legal and illegal income opportunity; the 
excepted sign of the coefficient is negative. RGDP is the relative gross domestic product as share of 
the provincial GDP per capita over national GDP per capita as proxy for legal (or illegal) income 
opportunity, the excepted sign of the coefficient is negative. Young is the percentage of population 
between 19 to 25 years old over the total population; Old is the share of people over 65 years on the 
total  provincial  population.  The  expected  sign  of  these  coefficients  are  positive  and  negative, 
respectively; it is plausible to suppose that young people are more favourable to commit a crime for 
different social reasons: to follow peer group; the absence of reputation feeling, etc (e.g., see Eide 
1994; Glaeser et al. 1996; Akerlof 1997). Finally, Foreigner is the share of resident foreigners over 
the  total  provincial  population.  In  a  country  as  Italy,  characterized  in  the  last  years  by  high 
immigration rate, mostly from non-European countries it is correct to include such a variable for 
two  main  reasons:  firstly  because  many  empirical  analyses  demonstrated  the  influence  of  this 
variable on crime activities and secondly because it is a matter of facts that recent immigrants show 
an attitude to commit crimes similar to residents
6.    
If spatial dependence effects are included in the model (1), this leads us to the concept of the 
spatial  interaction  between  economic  phenomena.  This  introduces  to  the  concept  of  spatial 
autocorrelation,  which  is  linked  to  the  territorial  shape  of  the  observed  phenomena  and  to  the 
connections  between  observations.  Measures  of  spatial  autocorrelation  take  into  account  the 
dependence between observations by a spatial weights matrix W. For a set of N observations the 
spatial matrix W is an N x N matrix with diagonal elements equal to 0; the other elements wij 
represent the intensity of the effect of territorial area i on territorial area j (see Anselin and Bera 
1998).  The  matrix  defines  the  structure  and  the  intensity  of  spatial  effects,  and  it  may  be  a 
contiguity matrix, or a proximity matrix based on a distance function, or a relational weights matrix. 
In the literature, there are very few formal guidelines and suggestions on the choice of the most 
adequate spatial weights (for details, see Anselin 1988, 2002; Anselin and Bera 1998; Leenders 
2002; Dietz 2002). Here, we use three different kinds of matrices: rook contiguity and distance 
matrix, and a relation matrix based on the inter-provincial migration flows. All the matrices are 
row-standardized. The rook contiguity matrix is a binary spatial weight such that  /
s
ij ij ij w w w = ∑  if 
the provinces i and j are contiguous (i.e., share a border), and 
s
ij w = 0 otherwise. With respect to 
distance  matrix,  given  the  Euclidean  distance  between  two  provinces  ij d ,  each  element  of  the 











 for i≠j, and 
s
ij w = 0 otherwise. Finally, relating to relation weight 
matrix, given the migration inter-provincial flows, fij, the spatial weight is equal to  /
s
ij ij ij w f f = ∑  
for i≠j, and 
s
ij w = 0 otherwise.  
As  argued  above,  the  three  matrices  let  us  to  catch  different  spatial  effects  as  contiguity, 
geographical distance and relational effects.  
                                                 
6 Recently the Home Office Minister, Giuliano Amato, presented a report on crime activities in Italy showing that 
offences attributed to foreigners increased rapidly during last 5 years.   18 
The  most  general  spatial  model  includes  spatial  dependence  effects  relating  to  dependent 
variable, independent variables and error terms. To identify the best specification of the model we 
follow  the  hybrid  specification  strategy  (see  Anselin  et  al.  1996;  Florax  et  al.  2003)  without 
ignoring the theoretical arguments on the basis of which model (1) was performed.  
Considering the following spatial dependence models:  
 
; C WC X ρ β ε = + +                       (2) 
 
;  C X β ε = +  with   W ε λ ε ξ = +                   (3) 
where WC is a spatially lagged dependent variable,  ρ  is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and 
measures the spillover effect connected to the dependent variable;  Wε is a spatially lagged error 
term, λ  is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and ξ  is the error term
7. 
 According to the hybrid specification strategy, we test the statistical significance of λ and ρ, 
departing from a model without spatial effects using a separate LM test. We test whether λ and ρ are 
equal to 0; if neither are equal to 0, we could choose between a spatial error or a spatial lag model, 
on the basis of the largest robust LM statistics (see Anselin et al. 1996). If only LMλ (or LMρ) is 
significant, a spatial error (or spatial lag) model could be estimated.  
To  test  our  model,  data  from  different  sources  have  been  used:  Murder,  Theft,  Fraud  and 
Squeeze  from  Italian  Statistic  Agency,  Judicial  Statistics  (ISTAT  1999a,  2003a),  Severity, 
Probability and Unknown from Italian Statistic Agency, Judicial Statistics (ISTAT 2000, 2003a); 
Old and Young population from Italian Statistic Agency, Demographic Statistics (ISTAT 1999b, 
2003b); Foreigners  from Italian Statistic Agency, Territorial Indicators (ISTAT 1998, 2002); young 
male unemployment rate from Italian Statistic Agency, Italian Survey on Labour Force  (ISTAT 
1999c, 2003c); and value added per capita, Italian Statistic Agency, Regional Accounting (1999d 
and 2003d). 
The  empirical  findings,  discussed  in  the  next  section,  were  obtained  in  the  light  of  the 
aforementioned specification strategy, theoretical and empirical arguments. 
 
 
4.  Empirical results  
 
The previous section has identified – on the basis of theory, the empirical insights and the 
availability  of  data  –  some  relevant  variables  that  explain  the  differences  of  crime  in  Italian 
provinces. Clearly, it is not expected that all variables included in model (1) would be required in an 
adequate statistical model. In fact, in our case the estimation of model (1) has produced relevant 
statistical problems, like heteroskedasticity and multicollinarity. Hence, these problems had to be 
solved by  testing a double log model, and following a model selection strategy. Specifically, we 
did not include in the statistical model the variables Probability, Sser, GDP, RGDP, Young, Old e 
Foreigners, because they either caused a severe multicollinearity problems or were not significant. 
With  respect  the  last  variable,  we  include  in  the  model  the  foreigners  at  t-1;  it  is  plausible  to 
                                                 
7 It is worth asking whether a more general model than the models 2 and 3 would be preferable; i.e. a model with 
spatially lag dependent and explanatory variables. In this case, an LR test on a common factor hypothesis should be 
done. Specifically, the autocorrelated error model is equivalent to a special form of spatial lag model by the following 
transformation of dependent and independent variables: (Y - λWY) e (X - λWX); so the spatial lag model can be written 
as Y = λWY + Xβ - λWXβ + ε. This is a subset, known as the common factor hypothesis model, of the more general 
model Y = λWY + Xβ + WXδ + ε. The LR test of the common factor hypothesis tests the hypothesis δ = λβ: if the null 
hypothesis is rejected a more general model with lagged independent variables must be estimated. 
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hypothesize that crime at the time t depends on the share of foreigners at t-1, in fact 1 year is a mean 
time  during  that  the  foreigners  look  for  a  job  or  an  alternative  illegal  activity.  That  let  us  to 
eliminate correlation problem between foreigners and Sind (or Umale25-29). 
The estimable statistical model used for our final estimation is thus the following:     
1 2 3 4 25 29 5
t t t t t t
o C Severity Unknown Sind Umale Foreigners β β β β β β ε − = + + + + + +                      (4) 
Tables 4-7 show the OLS and ML estimates for the different kinds of crimes for 1999 and 2003. 
The results show that in 1999 crimes activities in Italian provinces are affected by spatial effect, on 
the contrary in 2003 this effect disappears with the only exception of thefts. Moreover, the expected 
signs  are  generally  confirmed  for  deterrence  and  socio-economic  variables.  Further,  the  use  of 
different weights matrices lead to catch the different strength of the spatial effect of crime activities.  
With respect the murder activity for the 1999 and 2003, all the variables, with the exception of 
Unknown and Sind are significant. In 1999, in contrast to 2003, the LM tests on omitted spatially 
lagged dependent variables and spatially lagged error term by contiguity matrix appear to give a 
significant value equal to 9.48 and 3.09, respectively. Further, in 1999, relating to the proximity 
matrix the LM test on omitted spatially lagged dependent is also significant and equal to 6.37. 
While, using the relational weight matrix, no spatial dependence exists; it was expected given the 
low value of Moran-I statistics. 
The significant value of the robust LMρ tests, for both contiguity and proximity matrix indicates that 
ρ ≠ 0; so, a spatial lag model has to be estimated. The estimations of our spatial lag regression 
model  are  shown  in  columns  2-3  of  Table  4.  The  estimations  related  to  both  matrices  show  a 
significant and consistent spatial effect explaining the differences of provincial murder activity. The 
coefficient of the variable WCmurder is rather large; ρ is equal to 0.33 and 0.67 relating to contiguity 
and  proximity  matrix,  respectively  (Table  4).  The  positive  value  of  ρ  implies  that  murders  in 
province  i  depends  directly  on  the  murders  in  other  neighbouring  provinces;  in  other  words 
provinces with high, or low, percentage of murders are clustered together. This result reflects the 
geographic distribution of this crime characterized by low and high rates of murders in the central-
northern and southern provinces, respectively. In particular, the high rate of murders in the southern 
provinces could be connected to the phenomenon of organized crime that features many southern 
areas  (e.g.  Camorra,  Sacra  Corona  Unita,  ‘Ndrangheta,  Mafia,  etc.).  Moreover,  the  murder 
differences are explained by the severity, while the unknown is not significant in both spatial lag 
models. The positive sign of the coefficient of Severity implies that percentage of murders depends 
strongly on the severity of punishment, i.e. an increase of one year of the punishment gives a more 
than proportional increase of murders. This result, in contrast to the many empirical findings from 
the literature, could indicate a vicious circle; i.e. a person that spend many years in prison, once 
he/she served a long sentence it will be difficult to enter again in the ‘society’, to look for an job 
and to find an job because he/she does not have adequate social network knowledge and skills to 
change his/her living; so he/she will enter easier into local crime groups (‘peer group’) because 
these are ‘settings’ he/she know very well (see Homant 1984; Orsagh et al. 1988). All that may lead 
released  people  from  the  prison,  with  a  low  attitude  to  change  his/her  living,  to  start  again  to 
commit a crime as consequence of his/her entrance in the crime groups. On the other hand, the 
positive relation between murder and severity  might be connected to  a high  attitude to violent 
behaviour as the consequence to spend a long period in prison; i.e. a person that spend many years 
in prison, that is a environment characterized by violent and repressive behaviours, could improve 
his/her violent attitude becoming inclinable to do crime activities (Eronen et al. 1996). In 1999, 
moreover, the murder activity is positively linked to the young male unemployment; in other words, 
in the provinces where the murder rate is high, the young male unemployment is high. This result 
reflects the geographical distribution of murder and unemployment in Italian provinces: high (or 
low) rate of murders and young unemployment together characterizing the southern (or northern) 
provinces. Finally, the Foreigners variable show a lower strength to explain the provincial murder 
differences with respect to the others variables. Even if the coefficient is weakly significant its   20 
positive sign indicates that a marginal increasing of resident foreigners gives a less proportional 
increase of murders (Table 4). 
In contrast to 1999, in 2003, although the Moran-I statistics is positive and significant, the OLS 
diagnostic tests do not show any spatial dependence for the murder activity. Similarly to 1999 (OLS 
estimation column 1), in 2003 only the coefficient of severity and young male unemployment are 
significant. The latter has a value almost equal to that of 1999, while the strength of severity is 
smaller; i.e., in 2003, the severity effect declines, this might be connected to a higher attitude, with 
respect to 1999, of released persons to improve or change their life.   
Relating to thefts , for both years all the explanatory variables are significant with the exception 
of  Unknown  and  Umale25-29  variables  that  in  2003  are  not  significant  (Table  5).  In  1999,  the 
diagnostic for spatial dependence indicates a spatial autocorrelation exists and it pertains to the 
dependent variable, if we use a proximity matrix, or the error term, if we use a contiguity and 
relational  matrix.  The  estimations  obtained  by  the  three  different  spatial  models  do  not  show 
relevant differences in terms of sign and significance of coefficients. So, we focussed on model in 
column 4 Table 5 because it presents the lowest AIC value. In 1999, the thefts are affected by a 
high  contagious  effect  equal  to  0.816  and  all  explanatory  variables  are  significant  with  the 
exception of Umale25-29. It is worthy to notice both deterrence variables have a positive effect on 
theft, though the efficiency of police authority in deterring crime (Unknown) is more effective than 
the severity of punishment. As said above, relating to the positive effect of severity on theft, this 
reflects vicious circle where a higher punishment gives to a higher attitude to commit crimes. Also 
in 2003, the theft crime is characterized by a contagious effect that is catch by a contiguity weights 
matrix, but in contrast to 1999 the Unknown is not significant. It is worthy to notice that in contrast 
to the other types of crime, the Sind is significant in both years and its negative effect on theft is 
higher in 1999 than 2003. 
Finally,  the  estimations  related  to  fraud  and  squeeze  activities  show  a  very  different 
performance in the two years analysed. In particular, in 1999 relating to fraud activity, all variables 
with the exception of Sind are significant. The significant values of the LMρ test and robust LMρ 
one relating to three spatial weights matrices indicate that a spatial lag model has to be estimated. 
The ML estimates relate to all spatial weights matrices do not show relevant differences in term of 
significance and sign of the coefficients. Therefore, we focus on the model in column 2 obtained by 
using a contiguity weights matrix because it is the model that satisfied the ordering of Wald (W), 
Likelihood  Ratio  (LR)  and  Lagrange  Multiplier  statistics  in  terms  of  their  magnitude;  i.e. 
W>LR>LM; also  AIC  value has been also considered to chose the best model. In particular, in 
contrast to murders, only the Unknown variable is significant and its coefficient has the positive 
expected sign. Therefore, the fraud crime is not sensible to the deterrence variable as severity, while 
the unknown deterrence variable has almost proportional effect on frauds discouraging its activity. 
Among the socio-economic variables, Umale25-29 and Foreigners present significant coefficients. In 
particular,  the  relevant  value  of  the  Foreigners  coefficient  should  lead  policy  makers  to  pay 
attention  on  the  effects  linked  to  the  presence  of  migrates  on  crime  activities  as  frauds.  The 
significant  and  positive  sign  of  the  variable  confirm  the  insights  provided  by  the  descriptive 
statistics from ISTAT (1999a) that underlined that foreigners have a similar attitude to resident 
population to commit a crime. Further, the fraud crime is characterized by a high contagious effect 
equal to 0.58. This means some policies focussing on the reduction of fraud in the province i could 
give a positive effect on the neighbouring provinces. 
In 2003, in contrast to 1999, the frauds OLS model does not describe well the phenomenon; in fact 
all variable, with the exception of the constant, are not significant and the R
2 test on goodness fit is 
very low (0.03). The low value of the R
2 test indicates that some other variables should be included 
in the model to describe the frauds difference in 2003; the bad fit of the model lead to hypothesize 
that some relevant or ‘shock’ effect have acted on the featuring of frauds. This ‘shock’ effect might 
be the new regulation of ‘indultino’ applied in 2003; the law provided a discount of the punishment 
for some kinds of crime as fraud.  It is plausible to think that punishment discount encouraged   21 
people to commit crime activities. This immeasurable effect – that gets to reflecting in the high 
increasing of fraud offences in 2003 respect to 1999 – could explain a part of the bad fit of the 
model. Moreover, other causes could explain the fraud offences and improve the fit of the model. 
Maybe, other relevant variables should be included in the model in order to take into account the 
socio-economic differences between the 1999 and 2003, like the percentage of employees in the 
service sector as a proxy of fraud offences connected to white-collar workers; in fact, these are 
strongly  linked  to  the  criminal  organization.  Because  of,  severe  multicollinearity  problem,  the 
number of employees in service sector has not been included in our analysis. In order to catch the 
effect of this variable further improving could be done by using instrumental variable methods. 
Similar  considerations  could  be  done  with  respect  to  squeezes  for  the  2003,  in  fact  only 
Umale25-29  presents  a  significant  coefficient  (Table  7).  While  in  1999,  the  squeeze  crime  is 
explained by the Umale25-29 and Unknown, both variables show the expected sign.  Further, the 
diagnostic on spatial dependence indicates that a spatial lag model for both contiguity and proximity 
matrix has to be estimated. The best spatial lag model was the model in column 3 Table 7 related to 
the  proximity  matrix  and  with  the  lowest  AIC.  The  spatial  lag  model  shows  that  squeezes  are 
affected  by  a  relevant  and  significant  neighbouring  effect  equal  to  0.74.  Further,  between  the 
deterrence variables only the Unknown has a positive effect on squeezes; while among the socio-
economic variables only the Umale25-29 has a positive and less than proportional effect on squeeze 
crime.  
Briefly,  the  analysis  shows  a  neighbouring  effect  characterize  the  crime  activities  in  1999, 
while this effect disappears in 2003. For all crime activities, with the exception of murder , the 
efficiency of police authority in deterring crime is more effective than the severity of punishment. 
Among the socio-economic variables, Sind does not affect on the explanation of crime differences 
with the exception of theft crime; while Umale25-29 and Foreigners have a significant effect for each 
crime and for both years analysed. 
Finally,  the  bad  fit  of  the  empirical  model  for  2003  leads  us  to  investigate  in-depth  on 
appropriate variables able to explain the differences of crime in Italy. As the main deterrence and 
socio-economic variables presented in literature were included in our empirical model the results 
obtained should recall the attention on the need to define more sophisticated model including some 
raised socio-economic changes that could act on crime as stress, time dedicated to leisure activity, 
less health style of life, socio-economic well-being inequality, high female unemployment rates; 
high level of education of female population; etc. 
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Table 4: OLS and ML for Murders, years 1999 and 2003 
 











































































AIC  203.990  196.869  200.128  164.464 
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ρ  -    0.668** 
(0.001) 
-  -  - 
λ  -  0.407*** 
(0.000) 
-  0.816*** 
(0.000) 
-  0.333** 
(0.004) 
AIC  59.724  51.024  57.33  46.159  75.293  70.776 
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LR Test Lag           4.691** 
(0.030) 
-         
LM Test Error          2.347 
(0.126) 
-         
LR Test Error        8.700** 
(0.003) 
  13.565*** 
(0.000) 
      4.516** 
(0.034) 
LM Test Lag        0.135 
(0.714) 
  0.058 
(0.809) 
      1.320 
(0.251) 
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AIC  135.233  131.515  132.601  128.149  160.469 
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AIC  169.336  167.297  164.887  149.433 
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5.  Conclusions 
In  this  analysis  we  investigated  different  crime  phenomena,  focusing  on  four  typologies  of 
crimes, in the Italian provinces in two years, 1999 and 2003. Interestingly the ESDA emphasised 
different  geographies  of  Italian  crime  activities:  some  crimes  both  against  persons  and  against 
property (i.e. murders and squeezes) are mostly localised nearby the organised crime (e.g. Camorra, 
Sacra Corona Unita, ‘Ndrangheta, Mafia, etc.) and other kinds of crime against property (i.e. thefts 
and frauds) have completely different geographies, diffused in northern provinces or all along the 
peninsula. Interestingly murders and squeezes follow similar patterns, while frauds and thefts some 
other  ones,  but  all  these  phenomena  changed  over  time  showing  a  general  dispersion  over  the 
territory. 
Having this disaggregated territorial level of analysis, we were able to capture interregional 
differences, otherwise flattened by an analysis conducted at the regional level. Using Moran-I and 
Geary-C statistics to test the presence of spatial autocorrelation  and using two types of spatial 
weights (i.e. geographical contiguity and distance), we were able to detect spatial autocorrelation 
affecting four kinds of crimes: provinces with high murders or squeezes are located nearby, and 
similarly happens to thefts and frauds, although the spatial autocorrelation is less evident.    26 
In addition, to consider how different spillovers effects are at play, we included another weights 
matrix, a relational matrix based on immigration flows, to be able to capture how social networks 
effects influence crime activities in different provinces. Moran-I and Geary-C statistics are clear for 
murders and squeezes, but more ambiguous for thefts and frauds.  
Once identified the existence of spatial autocorrelation, we estimated a CEM, including two 
types of deterrence variables (unknown and severity) and some socio-economic variables (share of 
industry, young male unemployment and presence of foreigners). Results confirm the relevance of 
these variables in determining crime activities, and for year 1999 they show the necessity to include 
a  spatial  term  in  the  model,  i.e.  crime  in  province  i  is  affected  also  by  crime  activities  in  the 
neighbouring  regions.  In  2003  these  spatial  effects  are  not  captured  by  the  model  any  longer, 
although Moran-I statistics show that presence of spatial effects. 
When relational weights matrix has been used, only thefts and fraud confirm the existence of 
spatial autocorrelation that is captured by the error term. This should suggest that respect to less 
cruel crimes against property other forces are at play that are not included in this model.  
Hence  the  use  of  different  weights  matrices  to  detect  crime  activities  confirm  that  the 
geographical  proximity  is  relevant,  and  that  relational  proximity  should  be  appropriately 
investigated.  
Finally respect to severity, this affects positively crime activities: this indicates that increasing 
severity with the intention to reduce the incentives to offend has not the desired effects on crime 
activities, on the contrary it increased crime activities, indicating the presence of a vicious circle; 
i.e. a person that spend lot of time in prison, once he/she served a long sentence it will be difficult to 
enter again in the ‘society’, to look for an job and to find an job because he/she does not have 
adequate social network knowledge and skills to change his/her living; so he/she will enter easier 
into local crime groups (‘peer group’) because these are ‘settings’ he/she know very well.  
Further  analyses of this model include the extension to other explanatory variables (i.e. the 
weight of public sector in employment) and to a spatial panel model to capture contemporarily the 
presence of “organised crime” phenomenon, different territorial spillovers and changing over time 
of a phenomenon that is also related to pardon law policies. 
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